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Askman: Torts - Wyoming Recognizes a Cause of Action for Negligent Inflic
TORTS-Wyoming Recognizes a Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193
(Wyo. 1986).
In September, 1982, a vehicle struck six-year-old Johnny Gates while
he rode his bicycle in a school zone. 1 As a result of the accident, Johnny
suffered massive brain injury and will require hospitalization the rest of
his life. Johnny's brother Joseph witnessed the entire accident and its subsequent injuries.2 Johnny's mother and sister arrived at the scene of the
accident before the position or condition of Johnny had changed.3 Johnny
Gates, his two minor siblings, his mother, his father, and his stepfather
brought suit 4 against the driver of the vehicle, Kelly Richardson.5 Johnny's
two siblings and mother sought recovery for severe emotional suffering. 6
The lower court dismissed each of these counts for the reason that they
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The plaintiffs
appealed from this ruling.
In Gates v.Richardson,' the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress' in bystander cases 9 is
actionable in Wyoming.' The decision is worthy of note, not only because
it adopts a tort action in Wyoming which is relatively progressive," but
more importantly because it utilizes a unique combination of criteria'" for
determining the potential liability of a defendant.
1. Appellant's Brief at 3, Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986) (No. 84-21).
2. Id at 4.
3. Id

4. The complaint was filed on May 27, 1983, with District Judge Kenneth G. Hamm.
Id.at 1.
5. Id
6. Besides claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a claim was filed on
behalf of Johnny Lee Gates for injuries sustained; a claim was filed for medical expenses
incurred and loss of care, comfort, and companionship by Johnny's mother and stepfather;
and a claim was filed by Johnny's father for the same. Id at 4-6. The scope of this note is
limited to a discussion of the three claims for relief for emotional distress. Plaintiffs Joseph
Gates, Peggy Merryman, and Kristina Gates each claimed that as a direct and proximate
result of witnessing the accident or its aftermath, they had "suffered emotionally and will
continue to do so for the indefinite future." Id at 4-5.
7. 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986).
8. The scope of this note is limited to an analysis of negligently inflicted emotional
distress, as opposed to intentionally inflicted emotional distress.
9. Although the Gates court holds that negligent infliction of emotional distress is
now an actionable tort, the limitations placed on it, see infra notes 80-133, are specific to
bystander cases. These limitations may be applied to some extent under other circumstances
which may justify an action for this new tort. This note, however, will be limited in scope
to discussing the restrictions adopted as they apply to bystander cases, as the Gates court
itself does.
Bystander cases generally follow a common fact pattern: A negligent act causes injury
to a primary victim, a bystander observes either the actual act or its consequences, and the
observation causes the bystander to suffer emotional distress. Note, Negligent Infliction
of EmotionalDistress:LiberalizingRecovery Beyond the Zone of DangerRule 60 CHI.[-]KENT
L. REv. 735 (1984).

10. Gates, 719 P.2d at 198.
11. See Winter, A Tort in Transition:Negligent Infliction of MentalDistress, A.B.A.J..

March 1984, p. 62. See infra notes 13-53 for the historical analysis of the tort.
12. None of the criteria established by the court, infra notes 67-71 and accompanying
text, is of itself unique. However, this particular combination of the four criteria is not used
by any other jurisdiction.
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BACKGROUND

The Impact and Zone of DangerRules
Early decisions in American courts required a plaintiff to show some
physical injury or impact to recover for mental injury.'" The courts based
the so-called "impact rule" on three public policy concerns."1 First, because
mental injury was so easily feigned, courts devised the impact rule to prevent fraudulent claims. Second, the rule placed limitations on what courts
viewed as potentially unlimited liability."5 Finally, several courts believed
that abolition of an impact requirement would greatly increase the amount
of litigation. 6
Courts began to realize, however, that a strict mechanical application
of the impact rule drew arbitrary and unfair distinctions between classes
of plaintiffs." Several courts remedied this perceived harshness by relaxing the rule, allowing recovery where only a trivial impact had occurred."'
Courts slowly began to reject the rule as an unfair and ineffective way
of achieving limitations on liability and genuine claims of mental distress,"'
although the reasons used to justify the impact rule are still used to limit
plaintiffs' classes today."0
In response to the need for new guidelines, courts developed the "zone
of danger" rule, based on Justice Cardozo's landmark decision in Pals13. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Spade v. Lynn
& B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Stewart, 24 Ind.
App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900); Morris v. Lackawanna & WN.R.R., 228 Pa. 198, 77 A. 445
(1910). These are the leading American cases on the establishment and application of the
impact rule.
14. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 360-61 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
15. Note that these two criteria are specifically used by the Gates court to justify some
of its limitations on plaintiffs' class. See infra notes 76-77, 83-85, 105-107, 122-23 and accompanying text for further discussion of their application.
16. For a discussion of these policy concerns as opposed to the policy concerns for recovery for emotional distress when the infliction is wilful or malicious, see Millard, Intentionally andNegligently Inflicted EmotionalDistress: Toward a CoherentReconciliation,15 IND.
L. REv. 617, 626-29 (1982).
17. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES &0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.4, at 686-87 12d ed. 1986).
18. Many of the claimed impacts did not even proceed directly from defendant to plaintiff. Id at 686. See, e.g., Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931) (impact
satisfied when plaintiff fainted from fright of a loud noise and fell); Morton v. Stack, 122
Ohio St. 155, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhaling smoke satisfied impact); Homans v. Boston
Elevated Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902) (slight bump against a seat was considered
impact); Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., 107 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1958) (plaintiff experienced
brief contact with an electric current); Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1978)
(contact with tubercle bacilli satisfied impact).
A favorite among commentators is Christy Bros. Circus v. Tusnage, 38 Ga. App. 581,
144 S.E. 680 (1928), where plaintiff was allowed to recover when defendant's horse "evacuated his bowels" on her lap.
19. Note that at least 39 jurisdictions, not including Wyoming, have abolished the impact
rule. Comment, The Twilight Zone of DangerNegligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
as an Actionable Tor4 15 CUMe. L. REV. 519,522 n.23 (1985) (citing noted authority A. Russell Smith). One commentator suggests that there are currently only eight states which still
adhere to the impact rule: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi and North Carolina. Winter, supra note 11, at 62.
20. See PROSSER, supra note 14, at 361. See also, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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graff v. Long IslandRailroad." This decision marked a new trend in determining a negligent defendant's liability, extending a duty to those plaintiffs whose injuries were reasonably foreseeable."
Although the Palsgraff facts and holding were limited to physical
injury," the decision's reasoning has been extended to cases of mental
injury in courts adhering to the zone of danger rule2 4 so that a plaintiff
may only recover for mental injury if within the physical zone of danger.
This rule is based on the traditional view that a defendant has a duty not
to unreasonably endanger the plaintiff's physical safety. 5 If a defendant
breaches this duty, the plaintiff should be allowed to recover for all
damages sustained." Foreseeability limits the defendant's duty by outlining a physical area where the plaintiff must be located in order to
recover.21 As defined by Palsgraff,this is the area within which a plaintiff could foreseeably be physically injured by the defendant's negligent
act.

21. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 1928).
22. The Palsgraffcourt established the notion of reasonable foreseeability in creating
a legal duty to any individual plaintiff within the zone of danger. The court defined the duty
of a negligent actor in terms of the potential risks of harm to the plaintiff which can be reasonably perceived. Id 162 N.E. at 101. According to Palsgraff a duty cannot be established to
a plaintiff outside the realm of foreseeable consequences. Id
23. In Paisgraff,two guards on a railroad car were assisting a man boarding a train
when a package dislodged from his grasp and fell. The package contained fireworks, and
on impact with the ground it exploded, throwing down some scales at the other end of the
platform. The scales struck the plaintiff and caused physical injury. Id at 99.
24. See infra note 37.
25. Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 847 (1984).
26. Id 461 N.E.2d at 847.
This rationale points out why the zone of danger rule is an arbitrary limitation on the
plaintiff class. The rule does not require a physical impact on the plaintiff, nor does it require
the resulting mental distress to be caused by being in the zone of danger. The duty owed
the plaintiff by the defendant is freedom from bodily injury, but the causation of the mental
distress does not have to be a breach of that duty. In fact, the cause of injury is the breach
of duty owed the close relative who is injured. The New York court in Bovsun made this
apparent. "Additionally, the compensable emotional distress must be tied, as a matter
of proximate causation, to the observation of the serious injury or death of the family member and such injury or death must have been caused by the conduct of the defendant." Id
at 849.
To allow recovery for mental distress which is not caused by the breach of duty to the
plaintiff appears to run counter to basic negligence principles.
But see Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court, aware of this inconsistency, also required that the plaintiff fear for
his own safety in order to recover.
A more sensible approach is found in those jurisdictions which recognize an independent duty of defendants to refrain from negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970). The freedom from negligent infliction of emotional distress is protected in Hawaii. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d
758, 764 (1974). If mental distress to a plaintiff is reasonably foreseeable, the defendant is
liable applying general tort principles. Id., 520 P.2d at 764-65.
27. Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander The TranscontinentalDispute between
California and New York, 51 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1,9 (1976).

See also Palsgraff 162 N.E. at 100, where Cardozo said "Itihe risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to
others within the range of apprehension."
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The leading American case on the judicial exodus from the impact rule
to the zone of danger rule"' is Waube v. Warringto." In Waube, a mother
witnessed her daughter being struck by a negligent motorist. The Wisconsin court held that a plaintiff may recover for emotional distress only
where the injury was within the zone of physical risk, where the emotional

is fear for the plaininjury manifests itself physically,30 and where there
31
tiff's own safety, not just the safety of another.

Some courts have recognized that by applying this test mechanically
injured parties are wrongfully denied the right to recover if they are outside the zone of physical danger, even if their mental injuries are genuine
and foreseeable.3 The fundamental unfairness of the zone of danger rule
thus lies in its Palsgrafforigin.' The Palsgraffparameter is a physical
zone of danger, which in many cases will not equate with the psychic zone
of danger.u At least one court has agreed that the foreseeable zone of physical danger is demonstrably different and perceptively smaller than the
foreseeable zone of psychic danger. 5
Although the zone of danger test is still employed in a number of jurisdictions,-" courts have begun to realize the inherent unfairness of its strict
application in mental distress cases.' 7 Instead of remedying the injustices
of the impact rule, the zone of danger rule merely established another
arbitrary 38
and arguably less consistent standard for compensating men-

tal injury.

28. See supra note 19.

29. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
30. For a discussion of the physical manifestation concept, see infra notes 136-52 and
accompanying text.
31. Waube, 258 N.W. at 499-501.
32. See, e.g., Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D. 1972), where
a mother was denied recovery for severe mental and emotional distress based on the zone
of danger rule. Her injuries were provable and readily foreseeable.
33. Simons, supra note 27, at 9.
34. Id. at 9-10.
35. Id. at 9. Professor Simons notes that the effect of this readily manifest impracticality is that several deserving plaintiffs suffering real and serious mental injuries produced
by a contemporaneous perception of a negligent act were denied recovery. See, e.g., Whetham,
197 N.W. 2d at 678.
36. See, e.g., Stadler v. Gross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980); James v. Harris, 729 P.2d
986 (Colo. App. 1986).
37. Winter, supra note 11, at 64, lists a mere nine states that still adhere to the zone
of danger rule: Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Tennessee, Vermont and Wisconsin.
But see Case Comment, DES and Emotional Distress:Payton v. Abbott Labs, 37 U.

L. REV. 151 (1982), suggesting that the zone of danger test is now the majority viewpoint. Id at 157. The author cites the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 436 (1965) for the
general rule:
(2)If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock,
or other similar and immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm
results solely from the internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability.
Case Comment, supra, at 157.
See also Bousun, 461 N.E.2d at 847, also suggesting the rule is in the majority and listing 12 jurisdictions which follow it.
38. See Simons, supra note 27, at 10.
MIAMi
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The Foreseeability Test
In Dillon v. Legg,3" the California Supreme Court became the first
American court"0 to recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress by an individual not physically impacted nor within
the zone of physical danger.41 Dillon concerned a claim by a mother and
a sister of a young girl killed by a negligent driver while crossing a street.
Although both plaintiffs personally witnessed the collision, neither was
within the zone of danger.'2 The DillOn court held that harm to a bystander
may be foreseeable" if (1) the bystander is located near the scene of the
accident, (2) the shock to the bystander resulted from a direct emotional
impact upon the plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observation of the accident, and (3) the victim and the plaintiff had a close relationship." Since this 1968 decision, many jurisdictions have followed Dil6

lon in establishing similar standards by which to decide bystander cases.'
The court in Dillondismissed the threat of unlimited liability and vex-

atious suits as inadequate reasons to deny recovery to plaintiffs who obviously suffer real injuries.'6 These considerations, the court reasoned, were
best served by depending on the efficacy of the judicial process to ferret
out meritorious from fraudulent claims. 7 The court stressed that "no
39. 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).

40. Although Dillon is almost universally viewed by commentators and courts as the
first decision recognizing a cause of action where the plaintiff was neither in the zone of danger
nor impacted by the negligent act, this is not entirely true. In Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210,
13 S.W. 59 (1890), the Texas Supreme Court allowed a woman to recover for emotional distress resulting in miscarriage. The plaintiff witnessed her landlord assaulting two men in
her front yard, even though he was aware of her pregnancy. She was neither physically
impacted by the event, nor in the zone of physical danger. Id.
41. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 914-15, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75.
42. Id

43. Thus, defendant would consequently owe a duty. I& at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
"MThe chief element in determining whether defendant owes a duty or an obligation to plaintiff
is the foreseeability of the risk, that factor will be of prime concern in every case." Id
44. Id

45. See e.g., D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (1973);
Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d
758 (1974); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295
(1978); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973); Entex v. McGuire,
414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982); Versland v. Caron Transp., 206 Mont. 313,671 P.2d 583 (1983);
James v. Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 375 N.W.2d 109 (1985); Nevada v. Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710
P.2d 1370 (1985); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Portee v.Jaffee, 84
N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983);
Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404
A.2d 672 (1979); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 642, 338 A.2d 524 (1975); Kinard v.
Augusta Sash & Door Co., 286 S.C. 579, 336 S.E.2d 465 (1985); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d
486 (Tex. App. 1978); Hunsley v. Gierd, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976).
46. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 918-19, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79. The Gates court agrees and uses
much the same reasoning in establishing the cause of action in the state of Wyoming. Gates,
719 P.2d at 198, 199-200.
See also infra note 145.
47. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78. The Dillon court, in analogizing this
issue throughout tort law said:
Indubitably juries and trial courts, constantly called upon to distinguish the
frivolous from the substantial and the fraudulent from the meritorious, reach
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the extent of that obligation for every cirimmutable rule can establish
'4 8
cumstance of the future."

Taken in that light,' 9 the decision stands for the development of a "psychic zone of danger,"10 which in theory gives deserving plaintiffs the right
to recover and limits a defendant's liability to those injuries which are
reasonably foreseeable. 61Since the inception of the Dillon guidelines, serious questions have been raised about their effectiveness. Most California
courts have interpreted them as strict requirements" instead of the caseby-case guidelines the California court intended. 3

some erroneous results. But such fallibility, inherent in the judicial process,
offers no reason for substituting for the case-by-case resolution of causes an
artificial and indefensible barrier ....Indeed, we doubt that the problem of
the fraudulent claim is substantially more pronounced in the case of a mother
claiming physical injury resulting from seeing her child killed than in other
areas of tort law in which the right to recover damages is well established in
CaliforniaId.
This is especially true in bystander cases where the relation to the victim must be close.
The relation requirement is seen as a further guarantee of genuineness. Id
48. Id at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. Some commentators have suggested, however, that
this case-by-case analysis of the Dillon guidelines may be no less arbitrary than the zone
of danger criteria. Note, Ochoa v. Superior Court One Step Forwardand Two Steps Back
for Bystander Tort Law?, 21 ToRT INs. L.J. 672 (1985-86). The author notes that several
lower courts, and perhaps even the California Supreme Court, tend to use the Di/on factors
as "shibboleths rather than guidelines." Id at 675.
49. Actually, the closest jurisdiction to approach bystander cases on a pure foreseeability basis, and use its guidelines as guidelines, is Hawaii. See, e.g., Leong, 520 P.2d 758.
50. See Simons, supra note 27.
51. But see supra note 48.
52. See eg., Trapp v. Schuyler, 149 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 197 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1983); Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980); Drew v. Drake, 110
Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980); Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506,
146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978); Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723
(1969).
But see Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978) (holding that summary judgment on the issue of contemporaneous perception was not proper
merely because the mother had not directly witnessed her child's accident); Butcher v. Superior
Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983) (holding that an unmarried cohabitant
may state a cause of action for loss of consortium if a showing is made that the nonmarital
relationship was both significant and stable).
The Supreme Court of California, although at times applying the guidelines mechanically itself, has specifically rejected "a rote application of the guidelines." Molien v. Kaiser
Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 923, 616 P.2d 813, 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 834 (1980). The
significance of the Dillon guidelines, the court said, was in the application of "its general
principle of foreseeability to the facts at hand." Id. The court noted that the same approach
has been applied to other cases since Di/lon. Id at 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35; See Tarasoff
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. App. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976);
Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. App. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765
(1974).
53. See supra note 48. See also Comment, Dillon Revisited, Toward a Better Paradigm
for Bystander Cases, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 931 (1982). That author represents the move toward

formality of the guidelines as desirable. Some measure of formality, he argues, is necessary
to assist attorneys in strategy and advising clients, to help judges control the trial process,
and to allow persons a means of predicting their potential liabilities. Id at 939.
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THE PRINCIPAL CASE

In Gates v. Richardson, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that negli5
gent infliction of emotional distress is an actionable tort in Wyoming.
55
Justice Cardine, speaking for the majority, found the interests of the
seriously mentally injured to be worthy of protection. 6 Noting that the
Wyoming Constitution guarantees access to the courts for persons who
are wrongly injured57 and that the Wyoming courts adhere to a "general
policy in favor of imposing the loss on the negligent tortfeasor rather than
the innocent victim,"'" the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the tort. 9
The Gates court implicitly rejected both the impact and zone of danger
rules,60 agreeing with Dillon6 that the duty of care should be extended
to bystanders in certain circumstances.62
The court held that the make-up of the plaintiff class itself limits the
threat of potentially unlimited liability" and the possibility of vexatious
suits. 64 These policy concerns should not, the court reasoned, deny recovery to those plaintiffs actually injured."5 Instead, the court established
a three-part test to delineate those plaintiffs who would be allowed recovery. First, only those persons who would be permitted to bring wrongful
death actions under Wyoming statutes have standing to sue." Under these
statutes, recovery is limited to spouses, children, parents and siblings of
the victim. 7 Second, the primary victim in such cases must suffer serious bodily injury or death. 8 Finally, the plaintiff must have observed the

54. Gates, 719 P.2d at 198.
55. The court's decision was 4-1, with Justice Rooney dissenting. The dissenting opinion argued that the change in Wyoming tort law should be applied only prospectively; that
the plaintiff class should be limited to spouses, parents, and children of a seriously physically injured person; and that recovery should be granted only to persons actually at the
scene of the accident. Gates, 719 P.2d at 202 (Rooney, J.. dissenting).
Justice Cardine addresses himself only to the issue of retroactive application of the law.
He stated that the law in Wyoming had not "changed," but the court was merely "pronouncing what has always been the law in Wyoming." Id. at 201 (majority opinion).
56. Id at 197.
57. WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
58. Gates, 719 P.2d at 198.
59. Id
60. Although there is no indication that Wyoming has ever followed either rule, neither
impact nor location within the zone of danger is a requirement to recovery after Gates. As
Justice Cardine noted, there "may not have been such cases" decided in Wyoming and not
appealed to the Supreme Court in which a rule of law applying either a threat of impact or
impact rule was used. Id. at 201. He stated further that "we are not changing law or overriding any precedent, but merely pronouncing what has always been the law in Wyoming." Id
61. Id at 195.
62. See infra notes 81-162 and accompanying text.
63. Gates, 719 P.2d at 197-98.
64. Id. at 197.
65. Id at 198.
66. Id. at 198-99. See infra notes 80-101 and accompanying text, for discussion of this
criterion.
67. See infra notes 86, 99.
68. Gates, 719 P.2d at 199. See infra notes 118-33 and accompanying text, for discussion of this criterion.
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is a material change either
accident or arrived at the accident before there
69
in the location or condition of the victim.
The court further held that once an injured party has established each
of these criteria, that party may be compensated for the entire amount
of mental damage.' 0 Unlike the majority of jurisdictions, no minimal showing of severity of the injury is required.'
The court determined that the plaintiffs met all of the criteria. Each
of the plaintiffs was closely related to Johnny. All had either witnessed
Johnny's injury or the immediate unchanged aftermath, and Johnny's
injuries were serious. 2 After applying the criteria to these facts, the court
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the claims for emotional distress,
and remanded for further proceedings. 3
ANALYSIS

Wyoming courts have allowed compensation for emotional distress
in several areas of tort law.' However, the narrow issue of negligent infliction of emotional distress had never been before the Wyoming Supreme
6 The court expressed two overriding public policy
Court until Gates.7
interests in restricting the new tort. First, it expressed the "view that
a negligent act should have some end to its legal consequences," and
the concern that expanding the realm of compensable mental injuries
increased the possibility of vexatious suits." Although the Gates court
held that a defendant's duty of care should be extended to include some
wrongfully injured parties, it balanced this against policy interests and
found it necessary to limit the possible class of plaintiffs.'8 The Gates court
courts could fix
concluded that by implementing these criteria, Wyoming
9
limits on the potential liability when necessary.'
The ProperPlaintiff
The Gates court initially limited recovery for the negligent infliction
of emotional distress by constricting the possible plaintiff class.89 Some
69. Gates, 719 P.2d at 199. See infra notes 102-17 and accompanying text, for discus-

sion of this criterion.
70. Gates, 719 P.2d at 200. See infra notes 134-61 and accompanying text, for discus-

sion of this test.
71. Gates, 719 P.2d at 200.

72. Id. at 201.
73. Id.
74. As the Gates court noted, Wyoming has "permitted recovery for emotional harm
caused by false imprisonment, [citations], malicious prosecution, [citations], and work-related
stress, Icitations). We have discussed intentional infliction of emotional distress and have
neither accepted nor rejected it as a tort." Id at 194-95.
75. Id at 195.
76. Id at 196.
77. Id at 197.
78. Id at 198.
79. Id
80. Id at 198.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol23/iss2/21

8

Askman: Torts - Wyoming Recognizes a Cause of Action for Negligent Inflic
1988

CASENOTES

courts require only minimal limits on this class, 81 noting that juries can
ferret out fraudulent claims.82 The Wyoming court, however, felt that the
public interest in limiting the number of potential suits was too great to
allow juries to decide which plaintiffs have standing.8 The court reasoned
that "a plague of nuisance suits could ensue despite the competence of
our juries," 8 4 if any bystander witnessing a serious accident had standing to sue."5
The Wyoming court borrowed this limitation from Wyoming's Wrongful Death statute. 6 The interpretation of the statute cited by the Wyoming court in Wetering v. Eisele87 limits recovery to spouses, children,
siblings, and parents. There is no doubt, as the court admits, 8 that some
deserving plaintiffs will be automatically barred from recovery,"9 though
81. See Leong, 520 P.2d at 766, holding among other things that the absence of a bloodrelationship between the victim and the witnessing plaintiff should not preclude recovery.
The court noted extraordinary circumstances in its opinion. "Hawaiian and Asian families
of this state have long-maintained strong ties among members of the same extended family
group .... rT]he custom of giving children to grandparents, near relatives, and friends to
raise whether legally or informally remains a strong one." Id&
See also Champion, 478 So. 2d at 20 (holding that a child, parent, or spouse has the right
to recover, and others may or may not depending on their relationship to the injured person
and the circumstances thereof); Ledger v. Tippitt, 164 Cal. App. 3d 625, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814
(1985) (holding unmarried and unrelated plaintiff could recover because it was foreseeable
that plaintiff, sitting only a few feet away from the victim, was likely a loved one who would
suffer extreme emotional distress; plaintiff and victim had lived together since plaintiff was
15-1/2 years old, and had a child together); Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th
Cir. 1985) (stepsons of victim stood in "close relationship" with victim and thus allowed
to recover); Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 582, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 726
(1976) (where the court in holding a foster-mother had a right to recover, said "[t]he emotional attachments of the family relationship and not the legal status are those which are
relevent to foreseeability").
82. Molien, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839. The court in Molien said:
the jurors are best situated to determine whether and to what extent the defendant's conduct caused emotional distress.... To repeat: this is a matter of
proof to be presented to the trier of fact. The screening of claims on this basis
at the pleading stage is a usurpation of the jury's function.
Id.

The Gates court specifically rejected this rationale in favor of specific limitations. See
C. KRAUSE &A. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 16:26, at 1124 n.27 (1987)

S. SPEISER,

[hereinafter SPEISER].

83. Gates, 719 P.2d at 198.
84. IL
85. See PRossER, supra note 14, at 366.
It would be an entirely unreasonable burden on all human activity if the defendant who has endangered one person were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person disturbed by reason of it. including every
bystander shocked at an accident, and every distant relative of the person
injured, as well as all his friends. And probably the danger of fictitious claims,
and the necessity of some guarantee of genuineness, are even greater here than
before.

Id.

86. WYo. STAT. § 1-38-102 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1987). This statute and Wvo. STAT. §
2-4-101 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1987) were interpreted to limit recovery to spouses, children.
parents, and siblings in Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1061-62 (Wyo. 1984).
87. 682 P.2d 1055, 1061-62 (Wyo. 1984).
88. Gates, 719 P.2d at 198.
89. See supra note 81.
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their injuries may be actual and reasonably foreseeable.90 Under the Wyoming test, relatives with a close relationship to the victim, but not included
in the immediate family cannot recover. Friends or cohabitants cannot
recover regardless of their relationship to the victim.9'
Although the limitation seems arbitrary, 92 the court rationalized that
such a limitation would ensure that mental injuries claimed were genuine9
while decreasing the possibility of unlimited liability. 94 By limiting the
class of potential plaintiffs to parents, siblings, children, and spouses, the
court felt it also protected the "profound and abiding sentiment of parental
love.',95 This interest, along with those of sibling, child, and spousal love,
has been widely recognized as worthy of legal protection.9
The court's reasoning, however, is inconsistent with establishing such
a rigid criterion. The Gates court exhibited an understanding that there
are relationships besides those of a mother and child worthy of legal protection, 9 and that injuries to these interests were objectively determina90. Using "reasonably foreseeable" in this context is virtually a misnomer. In its opinion,
the Gates court specifically rejects the usual notion of "reasonable foreseeability" and instead
sets the bounds on plaintiffs' classes within which it believes a plaintiff's injuries may be
reasonably foreseeable. Gates, 719 P.2d at 198. This is obviously an adulteration of the tort
concept of foreseeability, which inherently includes a case-by-case analysis of the facts to
determine a defendant's duty. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 72. The Wyoming court instead establishes its own idea of when an emotional injury will occur, and disallows suits not meeting this criteria, even if they may be more foreseeable than those within
the criteria.
91. But see supra note 85.
92. See generally Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional
Harm-A Comment on the Nature of ArbitraryRule4 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 477 (1982) (advocating a return to the zone of danger test). The Massachusetts Supreme Court said in Dziokonski "[elvery effort must be made to avoid arbitrary guidelines which 'unnecessarily produce
incongruous and indefensible results.' [citations] The focus should be on underlying principles." Dziokonski, 380 N.E.2d at 1302 (quoting Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass.
354, 365, 331 N.E.2d 916, 922 (1975) (Braucher, J., dissenting)).
93. Gates, 719 P.2d at 197. Justice Cardine for the majority, stated:
It is hard to imagine a mental injury that is more believable than one
suffered by a person who witnessed the serious injury or death of a family member. As the relationship between the victim and the person witnessing the accident becomes more attenuated, the mental harm to that person becomes less
plausible.
Id
In D'Ambra, 338 A.2d at 531, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the personal
relationship was the most important of the criteria for determining the scope of potential
liability. The court reasoned that the stronger the emotional ties between the plaintiff and
the victim, there mother and child, the greater the parameters of liability set by the zone
of danger. Id. See also Ramirez, 673 P.2d at 825.
94. Gates, 719 P.2d at 198-99.
95. Id. at 198 (quoting Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521, 526 (1980)). See also
Ramirez, 673 P.2d at 825. The New Mexico Supreme Court also agreed with Portee, stating
"[tihe existence of a marital or intimate familial relationship is the nucleus of personal interest
to be protected. The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress is a tort against the
integrity of the family unit." Id
96. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 366, states the position succinctly: "It seems sufficiently
obvious that the shock of a mother at danger or harm to her child may be both a real and
a serious injury. All ordinary human feelings are in favor of her action against the negligent
defendant."
97. The relationship between spouses and siblings also meets the requirements for recovery. See supra notes 86-87.
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ble.9 The question remains, then, whether an arbitrary line drawn at "close
relatives," can sufficiently serve all legitimate interests involved." There
is no doubt that the rule will fulfill the court's goal of limiting the class
of plaintiffs. Placing the line where it does will provide a convenient, clear,
and easily interpreted standard for future litigation before the Wyoming
courts. 0 It will, however, necessarily exclude persons with legitimate
claims from relief.101
The Scene of the Accident or its Aftermath
The second limitation outlined by the Gates court concerns temporal
and geographical proximity. Plaintiffs may not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress unless they either observed the infliction of serious bodily injury or death or soon arrived on the scene, observing the victim in an unaltered condition and location.'0 2 Most courts agree that
98. Gates, 719 P.2d at 197.
99. The Wyoming rule limits the apparently broad language of Wyo. STAT. § 1-38-102
(1977 & Cur. Supp. 1987) to the specific language of Wyo. STAT. § 2-4-101 (1977 & Cum.
Supp. 1987). The language of section 1-38-102 says in pertinent part: "'(c)... Every person
for whose benefit such action is brought may prove his respective damages.... Wo. STAT.
§ 1-38-102 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1987).
The court in Wetering, 682 P.2d at 1062, interpreted this as follows:
Mhe reference to every person for whose benefit such action is brought must
continue to invoke the intestacy provisions of the probate code. The applicable provision in this instance is found in § 2-4-101, W.S. 1977 (Cum. Supp. 1983),
as follows: '(c) Except in cases above enumerated, the estate of any intestate
shall descend and be distributed as follows: ... (ii) If there are no children,
nor their descendants, then to his father, mother, brothers and sisters who are
dead, and the descendants collectively taking the share which their parents
would have taken if living, in equal parts.'
100. But see Dillon, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78, where the court aptly notes
that the interests of meritorious plaintiffs should be allowed to prevail over mere alleged
administrative difficulties.
101. Some courts have adopted an ad hoc approach to these tort claims. In Dillon, 441
P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80, the court held that the victim and the plaintiff had to be
closely related, but contrasted this with "absence of any relationshipor the presence of only
a distantrelationship."Id. (emphasis added). This suggests, as some more recent California
decisions have held, that a blood relationship should not be necessary for recovery. This determination, the Dillon court suggested, should be on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Mobaldi.
127 Cal. Rptr. at 726 ("The 'close relationship' element of Dillon is expressed as one test
of foreseeability that negligent infliction of injury upon one person will cause emotional distress and consequent physical harm to another. The emotional attachments of the family
relationship and not legal status are those which are relevant to foreseeability."); Toms, 207
N.W.2d at 144-45 ("[Dievising one hard and fast rule for limiting bystander recovery in menThe problem of
tal suffering cases would be difficult and complex if not impossible ....
limiting liability will be best surmounted and will be more justly resolved for all concerned
by treating each case on its own facts."); Butcher, 139 Cal. App. at 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. at
503 (holding that an unmarried spouse may have a claim fulfilling the Dillon requirements).
But see Hendrix v. General Motors Corp., 146 Cal. App. 3d 296, 193 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1983).
See generally Comment, The Right of an Unmarried Cohabitantto an Action for Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress in California, 15 PAc. L.J. 925 (1984). The author argues
that the right to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress should extend
to cohabitants, both heterosexual and homosexual, who have a significant and stable relationship. Id
102. Gates, 719 P.2d at 199.
The Gates court contends to follow the rule set down by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in Dziokonsk 380 N.E.2d at 1295. The Dziokonski court held:
[A]llegations concerning a parent who sustains substantial physical harm as
a result of severe mental distress over some peril or harm to his minor child
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persons not present at the scene of injury nor arriving at the scene shortly
after the injury do not have standing to recover for negligent infliction
of emotional distress. 103
As adopted by the Wyoming court, this rule is not as strict as requirements adopted by other jurisdictions requiring that the plaintiff must have
a contemporaneous sensory perception of the accident.10 Courts adopting a stricter approach reason that limiting the class of plaintiffs to those
who actually or contemporaneously perceive a negligent act which results
in serious bodily injury or death will both save defendants from potencaused by the defendant's negligence state a claim for which relief might be
granted, where the parent either witnesses the accident or soon comes on the
scene while the child is there.
Id at 1302.
As opposed to the strict requirements placed on the familial relationship between the
primary victim and plaintiff requiring presence at the accident, sup-a notes 80-101, this rule
will allow for plaintiffs arriving at the scene shortly after a negligently inflicted injury has
occurred to recover under certain circumstances.
The Wyoming court's adoption of this standard, however, is not consistent with the
reasoning of the Massachusetts court. In Dziokonsk4 the court noted that "reasonable foreseeability" was the standard when allowing or disallowing recovery. Dziokonski, 380 N.E.2d
at 1302. Although some commentators have suggested that this indicates a "pure reasonable foreseeability" standard, see Note, Negligent Infliction of EmotionalDistress in Accident Cases-The ExpandingDefinition of Liability, 1 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 795(1979), dis-

cussed infra at note 108, it really appears to be somewhere between these two interpretations.
The Massachusetts court suggested that reasonable foreseeability be the standard, and in
cases of this character it must be tempered with when, where, and how the plaintiff perceived the injury, and that degree of relationship existed between plaintiff and victim. Dziokonsk4 380 N.E.2d at 1302. This does not, as the Gates court believes, adopt a strict requirement that a plaintiff must witness or come upon the scene of the tortious conduct soon
afterward. It merely notes that in these circumstances, psychic injury is reasonably foreseeable. Id at 1302-03.
In fact, the imposition of arbitrary lines such as these is specifically attacked in DziokonskL See supra note 92.

103. SPEISER, supra note 82, at § 16:28, at 1134:
In so far as it is possible to generalize broadly, it may be said that with regard
to negligent acts by the defendant, only a few jurisdictions recognize the right
of the plaintiff witness who did not suffer an impact, was not in fear of his
own safety, or was not within the zone of danger to recover, and those jurisdictions require that the severe emotional distress to the plaintiff result from
the direct and contemporaneous observance of the accident or conduct.
See also Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978) (parent
denied recovery who did not audibly or visually witness an injury to his child, but heard
of it later); McClellan v. Boehmer, 700 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. App. 1985) (widow denied recovery
due to no contemporaneous perception of the victim's injuries); Saunders v. Air Florida, Inc.,
558 F. Supp. 1233 (D.C. 1983) (father denied recovery where his perception of the accident
in which his son was killed was from television); Crenshaw v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp.,
466 So. 2d 427 (Fla. App. 1985) (mother of stillborn child denied recovery where child was
negligently mutilated by a commercial launderer, but mother was not at the scene nor did
she later view the body); Caparco v. Lambert, 121 R.I. 710, 402 A.2d 1180 (1979) (mother
denied recovery where she did not witness injury to her four-year-old daughter).
But see City of Austin v. Davis, 693 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App. 1985) (father's discovery of
his son's body at the base of an air shaft brought the father so close to the reality of the
accident as to make his experience an integral part of the accident).
104. See Ramire4 673 P.2d at 825-26 (requiring that the plaintiff's emotional injury must
"result from a direct emotional impact ...caused by the contemporaneous sensory perception of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident by means other than contemporaneous sensory perception, or by learningof the accident after its occurrence" (emphasis

added)); Marzolf v. Hoover, 596 F. Supp. 596 (D.C. Mont. 1984) (holding a mother could not
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tially unlimited liability" 5 and ensure the genuineness of claims.'10 In
Gates, the Wyoming court also addressed these concerns. 17 It found that
the adoption of the more liberal observation requirement 8 would undoubtrecover where she did not witness the accidental injury of her child, but arrived at the scene
soon afterward); Brooks v. Decker, 343 Pa. Super. 497, 495 A.2d 575 (1985), appealgranted,
508 Pa. 621, 500 A.2d 417 (1985) (denying recovery to a father where he had not witnessed
an accident injuring his son, but arrived at the scene and observed his son before he was
removed from the accident scene by ambulance); Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App.
3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980) (strictly construing the Dillon "contemporaneous perception" criterion and denying recovery to a father and mother who, although not witnessing
the actual electrocution of their son, arrived within minutes of the accident and observed
their son dying).
105. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1969). In that case, similar to Gates, a mother heard the screech of automobile tires and
was immediately on the scene of the accident which injured her child. Id Although the Gates
criteria would clearly allow an action in this circumstance, the New York Court of Appeals
said that the risks of unlimited liability would be drastically increased if recovery for harm
were extended to persons beyond those "directly involved in the accident." According to
the court, "once liability is extended the logic of the principle would not and could not remain
confined." Tobin, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
But see Ramirez, 673 P.2d at 826, where the New Mexico Supreme Court, although
adopting a rule requiring more stringent criteria than Wyoming's, said:
[Airguments concerning the dire consequences of recognizing this type of cause
of action have been unpersuasive in light of the development of bystander recovery in California following Dillon. No flood of litigation has resulted, no
unlimited liability has been placed on defendants, and this type of action has
not proven to be unmanageable to the California courts .... This fear has not
materialized in jurisdictions accepting the Dillon rule.
106. See Portee, 417 A.2d at 527; Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction
of EmotionalDistress:Making "The PunishmentFit the Crime", 1 U. HAw. L. REV. 1, 11-13
(1979) (an excellent discussion of the factors involved in establishing a "distance rule").
107. See supra notes 93-94.
108. For a criticism of the more liberal rule adopted in Dziokonski, see Note, supra note
102, at 795. That author advocates the institution of arbitrary guidelines allowing plaintiffs' standing who were actually present at and witnessed the accident. Id at 807-09.
This criticism of the temporal and geographical proximity requirements set forth by the
Massachusetts court is based on two faulty assumptions. First, that author contends that
the tort implemented is a "pure reasonable foreseeability test." Id. at 807. Although Dziokonski agrees that "reasonable foreseeability is a proper starting point in determining
whether an actor is to be liable for the consequences of his negligence," Dziokionski 380
N.E.2d at 1302, the court then posits several initial considerations to be met in determining
what is reasonably foreseeable.
mhe determination whether there should be liability for the injury sustained
depends on a number of factors, such as where, when, and how the injury to
the third person entered into the consciousness of the claimant, and what degree
there was of familial or other relationship between the claimant and the third
person .... The fact is that, in cases of this character, such factors are relevant in measuring the limits of liability for emotionally based injuries resulting from a defendant's negligence .... With these considerations in mind, we
conclude that the allegations concerning a parent who sustains substantial physical harm as a result of severe mental distress over some peril or harm to his
minor child caused by the defendant's negligence state a claim for which relief
might be granted, where the parent either witnesses the accident or soon comes
on the scene while the child is still there.
Id.
The note also reasons that because the court did not deny recovery to the father in that
case, who never appeared at the scene of the accident but merely learned of it from a third
party, there is a "greatly increased.., potential liability of a defendant far beyond that
existing in California or any other jurisdiction." Note, supra note 102, at 807. The court,
on the contrary, stated that it did not know where, when, or how Mr. Dziokonski came to
know of the injury to his daughter or the death of his wife. The court merely conceded that

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1988

13

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 23 [1988], Iss. 2, Art. 21
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXIII

edly still limit a defendant's liability. With regard to genuineness of claims,
however, this standard is as inadequate as the familial relationship requirement.'"
In adopting this standard, the Wyoming court contended to follow the
Massachusetts rule set down in Dziokonski v. Babineau."' The Dziokonski rule, however, relies fully on the application of reasonable foreseeability to the criteria,"' which the Gates court specifically takes out of the
jury's hands. ' 12 Under the Dziokonski rule, a finding that plaintiffs witnessed an accident or arrived on the scene shortly afterward is used by the
jury to determine whether the mental injury to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable. Under the Gates rule, a finding of the same facts automatically satisfies one criterion and a finding that these circumstances did
not exist automatically excludes a person from the potential plaintiff class.
Therefore, though the Wyoming court adopted the language of Dziokonski, it did not adopt the more liberal interpretation given it by the
Massachusetts court."'' Instead, the Wyoming rule should be read to allow
standing to only those plaintiffs who meet the specific language of the
Dziokonski court, and not as a factor indicating the reasonable foreseeability requirement." 4 The Wyoming court's criterion will, just as the
familial relationship requirement, exclude recovery for persons genuinely
and foreseeably injured,"' in this instance because the persons did not
arrive at the scene of the accident before anything had changed.
The Gates court places itself in the position of apparently adopting
one of the more liberal Dillon approaches," 6 yet interprets it in a much
more restrictive manner. The misreading of the Dziokonski standard
results in a standard which should fulfill the court's policy consideration
of limiting a defendant's liability"' and yet is more expansive, even if not
any less arbitrary, than most jurisdictions apply today.
it could not, as a matter of law, conclude that the allegations in his complaint should be
dismissed. Dziokonsk4 380 N.E.2d at 1303. Given the above factors the court presented to
evaluate foreseeability, it is doubtful that given the note author's statement of facts, Mr.
Dziokonski could recover.
109. See supra notes 92-101.
110. 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978).
111. See supra notes 102, 107.
112. Gates, 719 P.2d at 199.
113. See supra notes 102, 107.
114. Dziokonsk4 380 N.E.2d at 1301-03. See also supra note 107.
115. For a discussion favoring arbitrary implementation of this criterion, see Note, supra
note 102, at 807-10.
116. See supra note 102.
117. Although there will undoubtedly be litigation about whether the plaintiff arrived
at an accident scene "shortly after" the tortious occurrence, the additional requirement that
the scene must be "without material change in the condition and location of the victim,"
will stifle unlimited litigation. Gates, 719 P.2d at 199.
The Wyoming court also believes that claims made by persons under these circumstances
will maintain a presumption of genuineness.
The kind of shock the tort requires is the result of the immediate aftermath
of an accident. It may be the crushed body, the bleeding, the cries of pain, and
in some cases, the dying words which are really a continuation of the event.
The immediate aftermath may be more shocking than the actual impact.
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Severity of Injury to the Primary Victim
In most jurisdictions where bystander recovery is allowed, courts
generally agree that the plaintiff must have witnessed a serious accident
or its undisturbed aftermath."8 The Wyoming court again borrowed the
20
definition of "serious bodily injury""' from the Wyoming criminal code.
For a Wyoming court to allow recovery, the primary victim must suffer
"bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes
miscarriage, severe disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ."'' 2 This requirement serves the
same purpose of limiting the class of plaintiffs 2 2 and ensuring genuine
2
claims. 2 3 Oddly enough, there is no such requirement in Dillon.' ' This
21
has been explained in a number of ways. One commentator' suggests
that the lack of such criteria is in response to the staunch dissent in Dillon. It seems more likely, however, that the Dillon court merely assumed
121
this was incorporated into its reasonable foreseeability guidelines. It
would indeed stretch the concept to allow a close relative to recover for
severe emotional distress after they had discovered there was little or no
harm to the primary victim.' 28
118. Id
See also Portee, 417 A.2d at 527-28 (court held that an observation of death or serious
injury is necessary to allow recovery); Eaton, 710 P.2d at 1379 (holding the cause of action
for serious emotional distress requires, among other things, apprehension of the death or
serious injury of a loved one); Ramirez,673 P.2d at 826 (listing among the criteria necessary
for actions for this tort that the accident must result in the serious physical injury or death
of the victim); Versland, 671 P.2d at 587 (where the court noted, "we do not intend that
bystanders be allowed to recover even when there is severe emotional distress when the victim is not seriously injured").
See generally SPEISER, supra note 82, at § 16:24.
119. But see infra note 122.

120. WYO. STAT. § 6-1-104(a)(x) (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1987).
121. Id
122. Gates uses this criteria "[als an assurance of genuine shock." Gates, 719 P.2d at
199. Portee, 417 A.2d at 527-28, uses similar reasoning.
See also Comment, supra note 53, at 946, where the author discusses the policy reasons
for this particular limitation. He advocates drawing the line at "serious bodily harm or death,"
id, as defined in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63, comment b (1965).
The phrase "serious bodily harm" is used to describe a bodily harm the consequence of which is so grave or serious that it is regarded as differing in kind,
and not merely in degree, from other bodily harm. A harm which creates a substantial risk of fatal consequences is a "serious bodily harm," as is a harm
the infliction of which constitutes the crime of mayhem.
123. Supra note 122.
124. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
125. Note, New Mexico Establishesa Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress to a Bystander, 15 N. MEX. L. REV. 523 (1985).

126. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 926, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (Burke, J., dissenting). "As we asked
in Amaya" What if the plaintiff was honestly mistaken in believing the third person to be
in danger or to be seriously injured?" (emphasis original). Id
127. The initial determination made by the Dillon court was whether a defendant should
reasonably foresee the injury to the plaintiff, or whether defendant owes plaintiff a duty
of due care under the circumstances. Id at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
128. The Wyoming court based this conclusion on the "common sense" notion that a
witness should be expected to recover quickly if the accident involved this misperception.
Gates, 719 P.2d at 199.
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Although such an event can undoubtedly cause a genuine mental
injury, this limitation is necessary to protect the interests of defendants.I"
A defendant's duty of care may extend to persons beyond those actually
impacted or in the zone of danger."' However, the burden on the defendant would be immense' if the duty extended to all persons suffering
mental distress when there was no other tortious conduct involved, S2 or
if the tortious conduct involved would not evoke mental distress in the
reasonably situated man."13 This criterion appears to be based on the
reasonable extent of a negligent defendant's duty of care, and not on
arbitrary distinctions made merely to limit the size of potential plaintiff
classes.
Although this restriction also purports to ensure the genuineness of
a mental injury, this is clearly not always the case. A plaintiff may suffer
objectively provable injuries from seeing a non-serious accident. A plaintiff may observe a serious accident and not be mentally distressed. The
proper rationale for this rule should be limited to restricting the defendant's duty of care. Taken in that light, the criterion effectively achieves
its goals.
Damages
The majority of jurisdictions which allow recovery for the tort require
proof of an ensuing physical harm.'3 4 As the Wyoming court noted,
however, a limit on the amount of damages allowed a plaintiff would more
129. A limitation of this type ensures that a defendant who does not negligently injure
another will not be held liable for damages to persons believing there was serious bodily
injury. Comment, supra note 53, at 946.
130. Gates, 719 P.2d at 195. See supra notes 13-38 and accompanying text for discussion of these two concepts.
131. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23. where the Supreme Court
of California included among its criteria for determining the extent of a defendant's duty
in these types of cases, the question of the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for
breach.
132. See Note, supra note 125, at 531, where the author aptly suggests that this type
of criteria indicates the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress to a
bystander is not an independent tort, but one which is derivative of the liability concerning
the victim.
133. Hunsley, 553 P.2d at 1103. In assessing liability to defendants in these cases, the
Supreme Court of Washington said:
Inherent in the formula is the principle that the plaintiff's mental distress must
be the reaction of a normally constituted person, absent defendant's knowledge
of some peculiar characteristic or condition of plaintiff. In other words, was
plaintiff's reaction that of a reasonable man? [citation] This principle goes to
the standard of liability, not the extent of recovery once liability is established.
Id.
See Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 521 (1970).
Although the Wyoming court rejects pure reasonable foreseeability as a criteria for
determining whether a cause of action exists, its analysis of the policy principles involved
indicates that the less foreseeable a harmful consequence of a defendant's act, the more likely
the court is to conclude that this harm does not fall within a legal duty owed by the defendant. Gates, 719 P.2d at 196. See supra note 90. for a discussion of the Gates analysis of
reasonable foreseeability.
134. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1981). The Massachusetts court lists jurisdictions which specifically require a showing of physical harm as
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likely injure that plaintiff than defeat a meritless claim. 3 This is true first
because emotional harm may not manifest itself "physically."S, Second,
a plaintiff who has established the elements of negligence and an amount
of damages should be compensated for the entire amount of damages "so
that he is made whole."'3 7 In fact, by requiring a physical manifestation
of an emotional injury, courts may be
38 prompting plaintiffs to fabricate
physical harms in order to recover.'
Courts which do require physical manifestation usually do so to prevent fraudulent claims 13 9 or to limit the potential liability of a defendant
to consequences which are not remote from his negligent act.'"I In Molien
v. KaiserFoundationHospital," the California Supreme Court questioned
the efficacy of preventing fraudulent claims using the ensuing physical
injury rule.1 2 The court found such a requirement overinclusive because
it allowed a plaintiff with any physical manifestation to recover, no matter how trivial the injury."" The court reasoned that the requirement was
a precondition to recovery for emotional distress. Id. 437 N.E.2d at 175 n.5. Twenty-three
jurisdictions require proof while six require emotional distress to be physically manifested
in order to be compensable. The court cites five jurisdictions as still adhering to the "impact
rule." Id at 176 n.6.
135. Gates, 719 P.2d at 200.
136. See generally, Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress:The Case for an
Independent Tort. 59 GEO. L.J. 1237 (1971).
137. Gates, 719 P.2d at 200 (citing Hollon v. McComb, 636 P.2d 513, 516 (Wyo. 1981)).
138. Note, The Death of the Ensuing PhysicalInjury Rule: Validating Claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 213 (1981). That author suggests
that these administrative rules will achieve exactly the opposite result of their purpose.
Arbitrary rules requiring a physical injury to recover will reward unscrupulous plaintiffs
willing to create physical symptoms to recover damages. Id. at 223-24.
See also Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbancesin the law of Torts, 49 HARv.
L. REV. 1033 (1936). Professor Magruder suggests that if the law does not abandon the physical harm rule, victims would tend to "exaggerate symptoms of sick headaches, nausea, insomnia, etc., to make out a technical basis of bodily injury, upon which to predicate a parasitic
recovery or the more grievous disturbance, the mental and emotional distress she endured."
Id at 1059.
139. See, e.g., Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 174-81. That court stated:
The most common justification for denying recovery for emotional distress in
negligence cases absent physical harms is that that rule is necessary to prevent fraud and vexatious lawsuits .... It is in recognition of the tricks that
the human mind can play upon itself, as much as of the deception that people
are capable of perpetrating upon one another, that we continue to rely upon
traditional indicia of harm to provide objective evidence that a plaintiff actually has suffered emotional distress.
Id. at 175.
PROSSER has noted:
There are at least three principal concerns, however, that continue to foster
judical [sic] caution and doctrinal limitations on recovery for emotional distress: (1) the problem of permitting legal redress for harm that is often temporary and relatively trivial; (2) the danger that claims of mental harm will
be falsified or imagined; and (3) the perceived unfairness of imposing heavy
and disproportionate financial burdens upon a defendant, whose conduct was
only negligent, for consequences which appear remote from the "wrongful"
act. These problems are very real, and they must be met.
PROSSER, supra note 14, at 360-61.
140. Id. at 361.
141. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
142. 616 P.2d at 819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38.
143. Id. at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
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underinclusive as well, for it "mechanically denies court access to claims
that may well be valid and could be proved if the plaintiffs were permitted to go to trial."1 4 A plaintiff with a demonstrable, yet purely mental
injury would be denied recovery. The Molien court concluded that as a
means of ensuring mental injury claims, the requirement cannot be considered effective.'" Progressive commentators'" and courts1 7 have agreed
with the reasoning of this decision.1'"
The courts which maintain the ensuing physical injury rule are also
concerned with limiting the liability of the defendant. This concern is more
easily justified. The court in Molien followed the reasoning of the Hawaii
Supreme Court in Rodrigues v. State.14 1 To stem the tide of potentially
unlimited liability, the Hawaii court allowed compensation for only "serious mental distress."" 0 Serious mental distress is found whenever "a
reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope
with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case. "I1
The Gates court rejects this limitation, reasoning that the restrictions
on the plaintiff class achieve the goals of ferreting out fraudulent claims
and limiting defendant liability. 15 Instead, Wyoming now allows recovery for damages with no minimum showing of severity."' The court emphasizes that juries can assess reasonable damages for emotional harms"
and that undue influences upon these juries can be controlled by the
courts."' It noted further that the goal of limiting liability is6 achieved
by the three chosen restrictions already placed on the tort."1
144. Id.
145. Id
146. PROSSER notes that several types of mental injury are marked by detectable physical symptoms which can be objectively proven. Since it is possible to allow recovery only
when there has been an adequate corroboration of the claim, it is not necessary to deny a
remedy in all cases of this type. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 361.
147. See, e.g., Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 519; Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc.,
269 A.2d 117, 121 (Me. 1970).
See also Note, supra note 138, at 224 n.58 (that author suggests courts in Maryland,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Washington appear ready to do the same).
148. But see supra note 134.
149. 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
150. Rodriguez, 472 P.2d at 519.
151. Id at 520.
152. Gates, 719 P.2d at 200.
153. Id This is the approach taken in Hawaii, the most liberal jurisdiction in terms of
defining mental injury. In Leong, 520 P.2d at 767, the court stated:
Thus, calculation of damages becomes a simpler matter when the primary
response is coupled with a secondary one, because damages may be assessed
by more objective standards. Nevertheless, the absence of secondary response
and its resulting physical injury should not foreclose relief. In either event plaintiff should be permitted to prove medically the damages occasioned by his mental response to defendant's negligent act, and the trial court should instruct
the jury accordingly.
For an analysis of the nature, severity, and proof of mental distress from a medical standpoint, see Comment, supra note 136, at 1248-62.
154. Gates, 719 P.2d at 200.
155. Id (citing Cates v. Eddy, 669 P.2d 912, 920-21 (Wyo. 1983)1.
156. Id
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Contrast the reasoning of the Wyoming Supreme Court here with the
reasoning applied to limiting claims with close familial relationship. There,
the court agreed that "juries can recognize the frauds, but we also realize
that the longer a nuisance suit survives the greater the illegitimate settlement value it acquires. ' When assessing the physical and temporal
18
proximity of a potential plaintiff, the Gates court drew strict lines, 5
instead of allowing juries to determine whether the proximity was such
that an injury was genuine and foreseeable."' The reasoning used by the
Wyoming court to justify no minimum severity for mental injury to
recover is plainly inconsistent with this rationale. If juries are competent
6
enough to determine both causation and damages in these cases, ' then
the
genuineanalyzing
by
liability
of
limiting
juries are likewise capable
ness of claims and the foreseeability of injuries. 161Instead, the Gates court
implicitly admits that limitations on the tort are required because juries
are either incapable or unwilling to limit recovery.
CONCLUSION

In Gates v. Richardson, the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized for
the first time a cause of action in tort for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. In so doing, the court agreed that persons who are wrongfully injured due to another's negligence have the right to be compensated,
whether that injury is physical or mental. Instead of limiting the plaintiff's class in bystander cases to persons who are physically impacted or
within the zone of physical danger, the court will allow persons to recover
if their injuries are genuine, and they meet the court's three requirements.
This holding by the Wyoming court points Wyoming tort law in the proper
direction. It will allow more persons who are seriously and genuinely
injured compensation.
What the Wyoming court fails to do, however, is to establish guidelines which are based upon the foreseeability of the plaintiff's injury.
Arguably, this type of restriction would keep defendant's liability within
limits prescribed by public policy. The Wyoming court adopts two standards, required familial relationship and proximity to the accident site,
which are admittedly arbitrary, yet justified using this public policy consideration. Although the decision contemplates the necessity of compensating genuinely injured parties, it constrains the holding to stifle
unlimited liability. The court's analysis of the jury's ability to assess the
degree of mental injury to assess damages should extend beyond the consideration of damages to the foreseeability of injury and the limiting of
plaintiffs' classes in this manner.
DAVID FORD ASKMAN

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 198.
See supra notes 91, 113-14 and accompanying text.
Gates, 719 P.2d at 199.
The Gates court contends they are. Id. at 200.
See Leong, 520 P.2d at 766-67.
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